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ARGUMENT

I. Mr. York's counterclaims were never addressed on the merits and they do
not preclude him from raising an affirmative defense during an eviction
bearing.
Deutsche Bank as trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. AssetBacked Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-R8 (Deutsche Bank) has argued
that the trial court had already addressed Mr. York's affirmative defense when it
C',
~

dismissed his counterclaims. See Appellee's Brief, 20. The trial court, however,
never considered the merits of Mr. York's counterclaim. And even if the trial court
had, the dismissal of a counterclaim does not preclude a defendant from raising an
affirmative defense at trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "nothing in the unlawful detainer
statute prohibits the assertion of any defense or counterclaim by the defaulting
tenant-defendant." Bichler v. DEi Systems, Inc., 2009 UT 63, fff 25,220 P.3d 1203
(emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Utah law
recognizes a difference between an affirmative defense and a counterclaim. In

Harman v. Yeager, 134 P.2d 695 (Utah 1943), the Utah Supreme Court addressed
whether an affirmative defense raised in an answer rose to the level of a
counterclaim. The Court held that a counterclaim is "viewed as an original action
... and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." Id. at 696. Because
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the defendant's affirmative defense in Harman lacked "many facts essential to
statement of a cause of action," it was not considered an adequate counterclaim.

Id. at 697. In other words, a higher standard applies to counterclaims than applies
to affirmative defenses. A counterclaim seeks damages or other relief from the
plaintiff whereas an affirmative defense merely prevents the plaintiff from
recovering damages or other relief from the defendant. In an eviction setting, a
defendant may raise an affirmative defense and a counterclaim. If the counterclaim
fails, the defendant can still argue an affirmative defense at trial.
In this case, Mr. York filed similar pro se counterclaims in state and federal
court. The federal court dismissed Mr. York's pro se claim because he failed to
meet the pleading standard. R. 325-29. After takingjudicial notice of the federal
court's decision, the state trial court issued a memorandum decision dismissing

Mr. York's counterclaims for the same reasons. R. 334. At no point in time did
any court rule on the merits of Mr. York's counterclaims. Specifically, Mr. York's
fraud claims were dismissed because they failed to meet the pleading standards of
rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Considering this, it is entirely
inaccurate to conclude, as Deutsche Bank did, that "[b]ased on the persuasive
Federal Court decision and its own examination of the issues, the Trial Court
properly excluded ownership from consideration at trial." See Appellee's Brief,
20-21.
In what turned into a pre-trial hearing on November 21, 2012, Mr. York,
acting pro se, tried to raise his affirmative defense that Ameriquest Mortgage
4

Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-R8 did not
own the property in question. T. 1075: 18. In response to this line of argument, the
trial court explicitly instructed Mr. York to wait until the trial and argue it as an
affirmative defense. The trial court said, "Right. And those would be arguments
you could raise at trial because they haven't been raised before." Id. Even though
Mr. York's counterclaims failed because they did not meet the pleading standard,
it did not mean that he could not raise arguments about ownership as an
affirmative defense at the trial. The trial court even explicitly instructed Mr. York
to do so. Considering this, Deutsche Bank's contention that the trial court properly
excluded the issue dwing trial is untenable.
During the trial, the trial court appeared to be confused and inexplicably
refused to allow Mr. York to argue the issue of ownership in any way. This was
even after Mr. York directed the trial court's attention to the minute entry where
the trial court told Mr. York to raise the issues at trial. See 1076: 15. Instead the
trial court decided that the affirmative defense that Ameriquest Mortgage
Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-R8 did not
own the property was an "interesting question ... for another day." Id. at 25-26.
At no point in time was Mr. York ever allowed to raise his affirmative defense. In
light of this, Deutsche Bank's repeated assertion that Mr. York failed to present
evidence to rebut their position must fail. See Appellee's Brief, 16-20. How could
Mr. York present evidence of his affirmative defense when the trial court never
allowed him to do so?
5

The trial court erred when it instructed Mr. York to argue his affirmative
defense at trial and then later prohibited him from doing so. Therefore, the case
should be remanded and Mr. York should be allowed to raise his defense.

II. Deutsche Bank is incorrect in its unsupported assertion that proof of
ownership is not an element of an unlawful detainer action.
Without citing any supporting authority, Deutsche Bank summarily
concludes that "[p]roof of ownership is generally not an element of an unlawful
detainer action." See Appellee' s Brief, 17. Utah's unlawful detainer law, however,
is premised on actual ownership, and it will always be an element of an unlawful
detainer action when a defendant raises the issue as an affirmative defense.
Utah's unlawful detainer law is premised on the centuries of property law
that came before it. The ancient maxim nemo dat quod non habet, no one gives
what he does not have, is apposite. If one does not own a property, then one has no
right to sell that property at a forced sale or evict another person from that
property. Much more recently, the framers of the Utah Constitution were
concerned about the rights of Utah citizens who faced losing their homes due to
defaulting on loans. Utah Const. art. XXII, § I requires the Utah Legislature to
pass statutes to protect homes from forced sales except under certain
circumstances. 1 One of those circumstances is that the entity attempting to force

1

Deutsche Bank complains that the use of the Utah Constitution is a "red herring."
See Appellee's Brief, 31. This, however, seems to be based on a misunderstanding
of Mr. York's purpose in referencing it. Mr. York refers to the Utah Constitution
6

the sale of a property must have "security interests in the property ... for debts
created for the purchase price of the property." See Utah Code Ann.§ 75B-5503(3)(b). Utah's unlawful detainer statute is based on the common law and
comports with the Utah Constitution. It provides that "a previous owner ... is
Q

guilty of unlawful detainer if the person ... continues to occupy the property after
the [forced sale] after being served with a notice to quit by the purchaser." See
Utah Code. Ann.§ 78B-6-802.5. The statute is premised on the validity of the
forced sale, which would make the purchaser the new owner. If there is a flaw or a
breach in that process, then there is no one to serve the notice to quit to the
previous owner. Ownership, therefore, is absolutely essential in an unlawful
detainer action, particularly when it has been raised as an affirmative defense.

In this case, Mr. York raised ownership as an affirmative defense to the
unlawful detainer action. If Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-R8 does not own his property, then it
cannot rationally take advantage of Utah's unlawful detainer law to evict him. As
a result, it should have been necessary for Deutsche Bank to prove that
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2004-R8 actually owned the property in question.

to show two things: First, that historically the framers of the Utah Constitution
placed an emphasis on protecting homeowners from eviction. See Appellant's
Brief, 17-18. And, second, that Mr. York was banned by the trial court's error
because if he could show that Deutsche Bank does not own his home, then
Deutsche Bank could not evict him. Id. at 18-19.
7

This is also important from a policy standpoint. Since the recent mortgage
crisis in the United States, there have been countless examples of banks evicting
people from the wrong homes, evicting people from homes that the banks do not
own, and evicting people based on fraudulent paperwork. See, e.g., Elizabeth M.
Lynch, The Second-Mortgage Shell Game, NYTimes.com (Feb. 17, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/opinion/the-second-mortgage-shellgame.html?_r=0; Matt Taibbi, Invasion ofthe Home Snatchers, RollingStone.com
(November 10, 2010) http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/matt-taibbicourts-helping-banks-screw-over-homeowners-20101110. 2 The rash of abuses that
have occurred across the country in unlawful detainer actions underline the
wisdom in viewing ownership as a necessary element of an unlawful detainer
action. At the very least, a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action must show that
it has ownership of a property when the defendant challenges that ownership as an
affirmative defense.
Because Deutsche Bank is incorrect in its unsupported assertion that
ownership is not a necessary element of an unlawful detainer action, the trial court
erred in not allowing Mr. York to present his affirmative defense. This particularly
true considering that the trial court had instructed Mr. York to save his affirmative
defense for trial.

2

While the Rolling Stones article contains some of the most important and
thorough reporting on the subject, it also contains some explicit language.
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][][[. Preventing a Mir. York firom presenting an affirmative defense is a

st1mctuiral error and the harm is presumed.
Deutsche Bank has argued that even if there was fraud involved with the
forced sale and subsequent unlawful detainer action against Mr. York, it was
harmless. See Appellee's Brief, 31. It further argues that the trial court's decision
to prohibit Mr. York from raising his affirmative defense was harmless as well.

See id. at 23-27. The trial court's error, however, was a structural error and the
harm is presumed.
A structural error is a flaw in the "framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." State v. Cruz, 205
UT 45, ,r 17, 122 P.3d 534 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When
a structural error occurs the prejudice is presumed. Id. This is because if the
framework of the proceeding is flawed, it is then impossible to imagine how the
entire proceeding would have been different absent the error. With a "gardenvariety" error, see id., it is possible, and necessary, to imagine whether a particular
result would have been different absent the error, see State v. Dunn, 850 P .2d
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
In this case, denying Mr. York the opportunity to argue and support his
affirmative defense was a structural error in the very framework of the proceeding.
As a result, there is no record to show how strong or weak the evidence may have
been. Mr. York very well could have supported his contention that the

9

circumstances were exceptional enough to warrant setting aside the forced sale.

See Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 9{ 15,285 P.3d 7.
It should be noted that Deutsche Bank, by way of what appears to be an
inadvertent typo, has misquoted the Reynolds case in an important way. Deutsche
Bank quotes the Reynolds case as follows:
The Utah Court of Appeals articulated the standard and the timing to
challenge an underlying foreclosure sale, "The proper remedy is to
seek an injunction prior to sale ...."
Appellee's Brief, 17. The actual quote from the Reynolds case, however, begins
with a discussion about the kinds of circumstances that would justify setting aside
a forced sale. It then states: "Absent such exceptional circumstances, the proper
remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale ...." Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206,

,r 15. The distinction is important because if what Mr. York alleges is true, it
would certainly qualify as an unjust extreme that would justify setting aside the
forced sale. The way Deutsche Bank mistakenly quoted the case, however, gives
the impression that setting aside a forced sale is not an available remedy.
If what Mr. York alleges is true, then Deutsche Bank would be unable to
make use of Utah's unlawful detainer law to evict Mr. York. The record in this
case, however, does not indicate ~ow strong Mr. York's case was because he was
not allowed to make his case. This is a structural error in the framework of the
proceeding. Therefore, the prejudice must be presumed.
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Because the trial court refused to allow Mr. York to present and support his
affirmative defense, the judgment should be vacated and the case should be
remanded.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to allow the Appellant to
raise his affirmative defenses.
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